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r. a. fisher and the foundations
of statistical biology

introduction
In July of 1951, Sir R. A. Fisher (1890–1962) used the occasion of his Bateson Lecture to reﬂect on statistical methods in genetics
(see ﬁgure 8.1). Having made foundational contributions to both statistics
and genetics beginning arguably in 1918, Fisher saw them as quintessential
twentieth-century disciplines. While nineteenth-century antecedents could
be easily found for both, statistics and genetics came to maturity as “distinct points of view” in the twentieth century.1 Fisher played an important
role in articulating the point of view of both modern genetics and modern
statistics, but more importantly, he successfully managed their integration.
In doing so, Fisher did more than bring his training in mathematics to bear
on biological topics. He used his mathematical abilities to reconceive statistics, experimentation, and evolutionary biology.
Fisher came to biology as an outsider in the sense that his formal training as a student emphasized mathematics. His interests in genetics and
eugenics, however, began early as well. Even though there were other wellknown synthesizers of mathematics and biology at the time, Fisher’s interests and training were not typical of the great majority of biologists of
his day. Fisher’s innovative work in statistical biology met both with indifference from many biologists, as a result, and often opposition from more
established statistical biologists.
The opposition that Fisher’s innovations faced led him to comment, “A
new subject for investigation will ﬁnd itself opposed by indiﬀerence, by inertia, and usually by ridicule. A new point of view, however, aﬀecting thought
on a wide range of topics may expect a much ﬁercer antagonism.”2 The statistical, genetic, and experimental “points of view” that Fisher championed
developed signiﬁcantly over the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century. The
antagonism they faced only pushed Fisher to reﬁne them further. A more
passive advocate may have been pushed to the margins, but Fisher’s persistence, personality, and patrons allowed him to redeﬁne how mathematics
could be brought into the core of biological thought and practice.
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Figure 8.1: R. A. Fisher.
Photograph by SPL/Photo Researchers, Inc.

articulating new points of view
In retrospect, Fisher claimed that genetics was a natural source for statistical thinking because of its heavy use of frequencies and the natural
randomization of genotypes that make genetic experimentation easy. How148 | michael r. dietrich & robert a. skipper, jr.
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ever natural the synergy between genetics and statistics may be, Fisher was
initially drawn to their intersection through eugenics and biometry. As a
student at Cambridge from 1909 to 1913, Fisher studied mathematics but developed broad interests. As he himself commented, he entered Cambridge
on “the centenary of Darwin’s birth and the jubilee of the publication of The
Origin of Species.”3 William Bateson, Mendel’s English champion, had been
given a professorship the year before, and in 1912 it would be endowed as the
Arthur Balfour Chair of Genetics.4 Darwinism, Mendelism, and the debates
over their diﬀerences would have been unavoidable for Fisher at Cambridge.
Eugenics made them irresistible.
Sir Francis Galton inaugurated the English eugenics movement in 1869
with his book Hereditary Genius.5 Galton’s eugenics rested on the scientiﬁc
management of human heredity by encouraging reproduction among those
supposed to be “ﬁt” and discouraging reproduction of the supposedly “unﬁt.” In doing so, eugenicists hoped to direct the course of human evolution.6
Once introduced to the rising eugenics movement, Fisher’s youthful enthusiasm led him to help form the Cambridge University Eugenics Society
in 1911. Eugenics for Fisher was not a passing fad, however. His intellectual
interest in the topic never faltered, and Fisher sought to live by the eugenic
principles that he advanced by having eight children.7
Eugenics formed the natural bridge between Fisher’s interest in mathematics and the new ﬁelds of genetics and statistics. In turn-of-the-century England, Francis Galton and Karl Pearson occupied this intersection, and it was
to their work that Fisher turned as a college student. In order to understand
the resemblance between generations, Galton had developed techniques of
correlation and regression to represent heredity from a statistical point of
view. Like his cousin, Charles Darwin, Galton believed that hereditary traits
were continuous gradations of form best described by a normal distribution.
An individual’s heredity then was represented in terms of a law of ancestral
heredity, in which an individual’s ancestors each made a diminishing contribution.8 Inspired by Galton’s approach, Karl Pearson developed biometrics,
a statistical approach to biology, which supported a Darwinian view of the
gradual evolution of continuous traits under the direction of natural selection.
In 1911, Fisher addressed the Cambridge Eugenics Society on the intersection of Mendelism and biometry. At the time, Mendelism was cast by William Bateson in diametric opposition to the biometrical approach advocated
by Karl Pearson. For Bateson, Mendelism supported his view of discrete
hereditary characters and saltational evolution. However, as a dispute, the
arguments between Mendelians and biometricians also raised questions
about the appropriate role of probability and statistics. Fisher was taken
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by exactly these questions, and in his overview of both positions notes the
role of probability in each and praises the power of the biometrical use of
statistics to analyze biological observations without relying on theory or abstraction. Moreover, from a eugenic point of view, the biometrical approach
convinced him that it was possible to create “a slow and sure improvement
in the mental and physical status of a population” without the complications of the “experimental breeding” that Mendelism would require.9
While still an undergraduate, Fisher made his ﬁrst foray into statistics
with his 1912 paper, “An Absolute Criterion for Fitting Frequency Curves.”10
Inspired by work on the theory of errors in astronomy and mathematics,
Fisher criticized the least squares method and the method of moments.
John Aldrich claims that Fisher’s true target here was Karl Pearson’s 1902
essay, “On the Systematic Fitting of Curves to Observations and Measurements.”11 Pearson favored both of these methods, but Fisher found their justiﬁcation to be arbitrary, and so their agreement with each other was problematic rather than reassuring. In their place, he championed an approach to
error he had learned from the astronomers based on Gauss’s least squares
method.12
The dominant school of thought at the time was Bayesian and employed
what was called the method of inverse probability. Named for Thomas Bayes,
the Bayes theorem for any two events A and B claims that the conditional
probability of event A given event B is:
P( A| B) =

P(B| A)P( A)
.
P(B)

In this equation, the probability of event A, P(A), is called the prior probability, meaning that it is the probability of A before event B. The probability of
A given B or after B has occurred is the posterior probability. The Bayes theorem tells us how to adjust our prior probability of A in light of a new event
B; or the prior probability of a hypothesis, H, in light of evidence, E. In more
direct terms, Bayes theorem addresses the problem of how new evidence
can guide the revision of our previous beliefs—it addresses the problem of
induction.
At the time Fisher was writing, it was common practice to recognize that
if the prior probability was unknown, then one could assume that there
was, in Pearson’s words, an “equal distribution of ignorance” so all probability values of H are the same, or all beliefs about the probability of H are
equivalent. This means that the probability of H given E does not depend
on the prior probability of H, but on the remaining term, P(E/H)/P(E). Fisher
was critically examining the claim that the curve that best ﬁts the data was
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the one that maximized the posterior probability. What he was proposing
was that maximizing P(H/E) and maximizing P(E/H)/P(E) were not equivalent. In fact, they weren’t even both probabilities.
Fisher was a frequentist. He believed that probabilities described relative frequencies of events in a certain number of trials or experiments. The
probability of a kind of occurrence was estimated by the ratio of the number
of observed occurrences of an event for a given total number of trials. Moreover, given an inﬁnite number of trials, the ratio of the number of events
to the number of trials will converge on the true probability value. Fisher
understood the Bayesian approach as trying to assign a probability value to
something that was unique—not subject to repeated trials, and not subject
to sampling as a result. For Fisher, it was legitimate to ask about the probability of observing an experimental outcome, but it did not make sense to
speak of the probability of a hypothesis. To diﬀerentiate these approaches,
Fisher distinguished the probability of a hypothesis from its likelihood. The
likelihood of a hypothesis given some evidence is equivalent to the probability of the evidence given the assumption of the hypothesis. For Fisher, maximizing likelihoods was the more statistically sound method of estimation
and curve ﬁtting since it could be grounded in observed frequencies. In making his case for the distinction between probability and likelihood, Fisher
would transform the foundations of statistics. Translating the resulting
authority from statistics to biology and demonstrating the deep relevance
of statistics to biology were crucial in Fisher’s transformation from a mathematician to a biologist.
Fisher was drawn to the theory of errors by a paper by “Student,” really W. S. Gosset who was not allowed by his employer, Guiness Brewing,
to publish under his own name since the statistical test was considered a
trade secret. Gossett addressed the problem of estimating error when using
a small sample size. This led Fisher to consider how to estimate error when
calculating a correlation coeﬃcient for small samples. Moreover, Fisher’s
maximum likelihood method gave importantly diﬀerent results from Gossett’s. The ﬁne points of Fisher’s essay were not fully grasped by Gossett or
Pearson, who read it and discussed it in correspondence, but they did appreciate that Fisher was a young talent in statistics.
After graduation Fisher spent some time working on a farm in Canada,
presumably to rest his notoriously poor eyesight. However, Fisher seemed to
genuinely love farm life and would settle on a farm when he married in 1917.
By then Fisher had returned to England and, determined to do his part for
the war eﬀort, taught mathematics and physics at public schools since he
was not eligible for military ser vice.
r. a. fisher and the foundations of statistical biology | 151
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In 1914, Fisher published a proof of Gosset’s solution using multidimensional geometry. While other statisticians did not share Fisher’s fondness
for geometrical reasoning about distributions, Pearson did publish it in
his journal Biometrika.13 Pearson’s group was also occupied during the war
with distributions of correlation coeﬃcients, and in 1916, his group published a paper critical of Fisher’s approach, claiming that it depended on the
Bayes theorem. The injustice of this claim stung Fisher and motivated him
clarify his stance on likelihood as an alternative to Bayes. At the same time
it signaled a declining relationship with Pearson, who declined to publish
Fisher’s 1916 paper on correlation with regard to Mendelian traits. Pearson
probably thought of himself as the senior professor helping to sort out the
younger Fisher, and sent Fisher extensive comments on another 1916 note
regarding error and estimation. Fisher responded by seeking to put statistics on a ﬁrmer mathematical foundation that directly took aim at the
substantial work of Pearson.14 When Fisher published his own criticisms of
Pearson, their enmity became mutual. However, as historian Stephen Stigler has convincingly argued, the antagonism that Fisher felt toward Pearson certainly spurred him to develop his method of maximum likelihood
and articulate the grounds for the justiﬁcation of statistical methods.15
Throughout this period Fisher had maintained his interest in eugenics
and sought an active role in the Eugenics Education Society. This interest
brought him into contact with Major Leonard Darwin, Charles’ fourth son
and an avid eugenicist himself.16 Darwin became Fisher’s mentor and advocate around 1914, when Fisher began publishing book reviews for Eugenics
Review. While Fisher scraped by ﬁnancially as a farmer and teacher, Darwin
arranged for a stipend from the Eugenics Society. This undoubtedly helped
fuel the ﬁre that led Fisher to write over 200 reviews on eugenics over twenty
years.
But the relationship was something more. Fisher revered Darwin and
sought his approval. When he discovered that Darwin and Pearson had
had a disagreement on the eﬀects of natural selection on the correlation of
hereditary traits, Fisher sought to vindicate Darwin, but Darwin counseled
restraint.17 Nevertheless, Darwin encouraged Fisher to continue his work on
the intersection of statistics and heredity. Indeed, when Fisher’s paper on
the correlation of relatives was rejected by Pearson for Biometrika, Darwin
sponsored its publication in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. This paper helped Fisher land two job oﬀers the next year: one in the
Galton Laboratory and one at the Rothamsted Experimental Station. He
chose Rothamsted.
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evolution from a statistical ge ne tics point of view
When Fisher was at Rothamsted Experimental Station from 1919 to 1933, he
engaged with a mass of biological data that allowed him to revolutionize statistics, and he become convinced of the value of engaging statistical analysis
with real biological data. Researchers at Rothamsted had accumulated years
of data on crop growth and yield under a wide range of diﬀerent conditions.
Fisher’s challenge was to ﬁnd something biologically interesting in that data.
What he found and published in a series of papers was important both biologically and statistically. Biologically, Fisher was able to disentangle the eﬀects
of various fertilizer treatments from soil, weather, and cultivation conditions.
At the same time, Fisher developed methods for statistical experimentation
based on randomization and the analysis of variance that would radically
change the way in which any researcher could conduct a statistical experiment in the future. These methods were published in 1925 as Statistical Methods for Research Workers.18 Initial reviews were critical as primarily English
statisticians struggled to make sense of this new empirical approach. Reﬂecting on this later, Fisher oﬀered that recognition takes time when the revision
of cherished beliefs bruises the feelings of their holders. Fisher’s recognition
came ﬁrst from abroad, where experimental agriculture was established and
appreciated in institutions such as the USDA and many land grant universities in the United States.19
Fisher’s work on the analysis of variance as applied to biology had begun
much earlier in his work on correlation in evolution. In his 1918 paper, “On the
Correlation of Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance,” Fisher
considered the statistical consequences of dominance, epistatic gene interaction, assortative mating, multiple alleles, and linkage on the correlations
between relatives. Fisher argued that the eﬀects of dominance and gene interaction would confuse the actual genetic similarity between relatives. He also
knew that the environment could confuse such similarity. Fisher here formally
introduced the concepts of variance and the analysis of variance. He wrote:
When there are two independent causes of variability capable of producing in an otherwise uniform population distributions with standard deviations σ1and σ2, it is found that the distribution, when both causes act
together, has a standard deviation  12 +  22 ). It is therefore desirable in
analyzing the causes of variability to deal with the square of the standard
deviation as the measure of variability. We shall term this quantity the
Variance of the normal population to which it refers, and we may now
ascribe to the constituent causes fractions or percentages of the total
variance which they together produce.20
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Fisher used this new tool to partition the total variance into its component parts. He labeled that portion of the total variance that accurately described the correlation between relatives the “additive” genetic component
of variance. The “nonadditive” genetic component included dominance, gene
interaction, and linkage. Environmental eﬀects, such as random changes
in environment, comprised a third component of the total variance. In 1922,
on the basis of his 1918 work, Fisher argued that the additive component of
variance was the most important for evolution by natural selection. Indeed,
he argued that, particularly in large populations, nonadditive and environmental components of the total variance are negligible. Selection would act
most strongly on any factor with a large additive contribution to the total
genetic variance, usually by eliminating them from the population.21 Most
of the time, evolution, and especially adaptation, proceed very slowly, with
low levels of selection acting on mutations of small eﬀect and in large populations holding considerable genetic variation. Where Fisher’s 1918 paper
defended the principles of Mendelian heredity against the criticisms of the
biometricians, his 1922 paper defended Darwinism using the principles of
Mendelian heredity. Fisher’s aim was to respond to a set of criticisms that
Darwinian natural selection cannot be the correct mechanism of evolution because the genetics of populations are such that there is not enough
variation available for selection to act upon. During the course of the paper,
Fisher eliminated from consideration what he took to be insigniﬁcant evolutionary factors, such as epistatic gene interaction and genetic drift, and
placed his conﬁdence in natural selection.
Fisher’s synthesis of Mendelism and Darwinism within a mathematical
framework culminated in his 1930 book, The Genetical Theory of Natural
Selection, which became one of the principal texts, along with those of J. B. S.
Haldane and Sewall Wright, establishing the ﬁeld of theoretical population
genetics.22 Fisher begins his book with his case for the mutual compatibility
of Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection and Mendelian genetics. He
ends it by exploring the eugenic consequences of this statistical and genetic
understanding of the evolutionary process. Fisher considered the ﬁrst two
chapters, on the nature of inheritance and the “fundamental theorem of natural selection,” the most important of the book. Indeed, these two chapters
accomplish the key piece of the reconciliation by continuing the general argument strategy he had used in 1918 and 1922 of defending Mendelian particulate inheritance and then demonstrating how Darwinian natural selection
may plausibly be the principal cause of evolution in Mendelian populations.
Fisher’s mathematical approach is most fully developed in his second
chapter of The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. The arguments here are
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drawn largely from Fisher’s 1922 paper “On the Dominance Ratio” and his
1930 paper “The Distribution of Gene Ratios for Rare Mutations,” which was
a response to Sewall Wright’s correction of Fisher’s 1922 paper. Three key
elements may be distilled from Fisher’s “heavy” mathematics in the second
chapter of The Genetical Theory. The ﬁrst is a measure of average population
ﬁtness, Fisher’s “Malthusian parameter” (i.e., the reproductive value of all
genotypes at all stages of their life histories). The second is a measure of
variation in ﬁtness, which Fisher partitions into genetic and environmental
components (based on his distinctions from 1918 and 1922). The third is a
measure of the rate of increase in ﬁtness (i.e., the change in ﬁtness due to
natural selection). For Fisher, “the rate of increase of ﬁtness of any organism
at any time is equal to its genetic variance in ﬁtness at that time” (emphasis in
original).23 This last element is Fisher’s “fundamental theorem of natural
selection,” and it is the centerpiece of his theory of natural selection.
Interestingly, inasmuch as Fisher considered his fundamental theorem
the centerpiece of his evolutionary theory, it happens that the theorem is also
the most obscure element of it. The theorem was often misunderstood until
1989, when Warren Ewens rediscovered George Price’s 1972 clariﬁcation and
proof of it.24 Fisher’s original statement of the theorem in 1930 suggests that
mean ﬁtness can never decrease because variances cannot be negative. Price
showed that in fact the theorem does not describe the total rate of change in
ﬁtness but, rather, only one component of it. That part is the portion of the
rate of increase that can be ascribed to natural selection. And, actually, in
Fisher’s ensuing discussion of the theorem, he makes this clear. The total rate
of change in mean ﬁtness is due to a variety of forces including natural selection, environmental changes, epistatic gene interaction, dominance, and so
forth. The theorem isolates the changes due to natural selection from the
rest, a move suggested in Fisher’s 1922 paper. The relative importance of
the additive component of genetic variance was increasingly appreciated in
the genetics community after the Second World War. Price and Ewens recognized this and clariﬁed the statement of the theorem by substituting “additive
genetic variance” for “genetic variance” (since genetic variance includes both
an additive and nonadditive part). With the theorem clariﬁed, however, Price
and later Ewens argue that it is not so fundamental. Given that it is a statement about only a portion of the rate of increase in ﬁtness, it is incomplete.
The Price-Ewens interpretation of the theorem is now the standard one.
Fisher compared both his 1922 and 1930 exploration of the balance of
evolutionary factors and the “laws” that describe them to the theory of gases
and the second law of thermodynamics, respectively. Of the 1922 investigation, Fisher says,
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the investigation of natural selection may be compared to the analytic
treatment of the Theory of Gases, in which it is possible to make the most
varied assumptions as to the accidental circumstances, and even the essential nature of the individual molecules, and yet to develop the natural
laws as to the behavior of gases, leaving but a few fundamental constants
to be determined by experiment.25
He continues the analogy in 1930, adding that
the fundamental theorem . . . bears some remarkable resemblances to
the second law of thermodynamics. Both are properties of populations,
or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which compose them; both are statistical laws; each requires the constant increase
in a measurable quantity, in the one case the entropy of the physical
system and in the other the ﬁtness . . . of a biological population. . . .
Professor Eddington has recently remarked that “The law that entropy
always increases—the second law of thermodynamics—holds, I think,
the supreme position among the laws of nature.” It is not a little instructive that so similar a law should hold the supreme position among the
biological sciences.26
The received view of these comparisons is that Fisher’s interests in physics and mathematics led him to look for biological analogs.27 No doubt this
is part of the story. However, a more plausible interpretation of the comparison comes from treating Fisher’s 1918, 1922, and 1930 works as one long argument. If we do so, we ﬁnd that Fisher’s strategy in synthesizing Darwinian
natural selection with the principles of Mendelian heredity was to defend,
against its critics, selection as an evolutionary cause under Mendelian principles. Following this argument strategy, Fisher built his genetic theory of
natural selection piecemeal, or from the bottom up. That is, Fisher worked
to justify the claim of his fundamental theorem by constructing plausible arguments about the precise balance of evolutionary factors. Thus, his
piecemeal consideration of the interaction between dominance, gene interaction, genetic drift, mutation, selection, etc. led to his theorem. It was not,
at least not primarily, the search for biological analogues to physical models
and laws that underwrites the theorem.
No one has thought that Fisher’s contribution to evolutionary genetics
was less than groundbreaking. Rather, precisely what Fisher established, its
nature and scope, and exactly how he did so, has been less than clear. With
Fisher’s work on variance in 1918, his work on the balance of factors in evo156 | michael r. dietrich & robert a. skipper, jr.
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lution in 1922, and his fundamental theorem of natural selection in 1930,
we have a uniﬁed argument setting aside pervasive anti-Darwinism, originating a new mathematical approach to the evolution of populations, and
establishing the very essence of natural selection.
The Genetical Theory sealed Fisher’s reputation as a biologist. In 1933, he
succeeded Karl Pearson as the Galton professor at University College London.
His work on mathematics had earned him a place in the Royal Society in 1928.
His 1925 book, Statistical Methods for Research Workers, was changing the way
experimental biology could be conceived.

conclusion
R. A. Fisher made extraordinary contributions to the mathematical foundations of statistics, statistical methods for experimentation, and the creation of population and evolutionary genetics. When combined with his
strong belief in the social value of eugenics, the range of Fisher’s interests
pose a serious challenge to historians who would like to make sense of how
one person could simultaneously pursue such disparate topics and make
such important contributions to each. Fisher’s daughter and biographer,
Joan Fisher Box, oﬀered separate chapters tracing simultaneous trajectories
through his mathematics, statistics, genetics, and eugenics.28 Other historians treat Fisher’s interests in isolation from each other, and in doing so cast
themselves in sharp contrast to historians who see Fisher’s interests as mutually informed.29 Having posed the question of how nonbiological training
can foster innovation in the life sciences, we ﬁnd ourselves seeking points
of intersection in Fisher’s work. These intersections are plentiful, but what
were the historical conditions that allowed Fisher to ﬁnd success in these
intersections?
We claim that patronage and persistence played crucial roles in allowing
Fisher to successfully bring his mathematical and statistical perspectives
into biology. The patronage of Leonard Darwin early in his career facilitated
the publication of Fisher’s seminal 1918 paper on the correlation of relatives, and supported his work at the intersection of biology, eugenics, and
statistics. At the same time, Fisher’s personality allowed him to stubbornly
persist in the face of Pearson’s criticism and later opposition. Fisher’s willingness to engage in a dispute and to oppose Pearson and the entrenched
views on inverse probability were crucial in the history of his development
of the foundations for theoretical statistics, on the one hand, and the methods of estimation and experimentation crucial to biology and evolutionary
genetics, more speciﬁcally.
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We do not wish to claim that the success of Fisher’s contributions are
solely the result of patronage or Fisher’s personal advocacy. Their value and
utility were recognized by many. In the case of experimental design and statistical inference, Fisher’s work found an eager audience among agricultural
experts around the world following the path of Mendelism in an age of faith
in scientiﬁc progress.30 However, intellectual worth alone did not overcome
the barriers set by Pearson and other statisticians. Fisher’s results were
innovative, but the intersection of statistics, genetics, eugenics, and evolution was not an empty niche waiting to be ﬁlled. It took time for Fisher’s
early work to gain acceptance among the statistical and scientiﬁc communities. What allowed him to continue to innovate in statistical biology was the
support of individuals, like Leonard Darwin, and institutions like Rothamsted, where his methodological insights more readily produced new results
for ﬁeld researchers.
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